4 entries for "Elinor Ostrom: Governing the Commons"

[Theories describing leadership by 'the government' (rather than 'governments') expect it will rush to the rescue whenever the market 'fails' and rely on economists to advise when and how, without any concept of private individials to solve collective problems among themselves.]

I commit myself to follow the set of rules we have devised in all instances except dire emergencies if the rest of those affected make a similar commitment and act accordingly.

Once appropriators have made contingent self-commitments, they are then motivated to monitor other people's behaviors, at least from time to time, in order to assure themselves that others are following the rules most of the time. Contingent self-commitments and mutual monitoring reinforce one another, especially when appropriators have devised rules that tend to reduce monitoring costs.

[Seeming simplicity is not equivalent to generality. Setting variables to a constant usually narrows the applicability of a model rather than broadening it.]

['I will if you will' becomes credible through monitoring that makes deviations visible.]

[Variables indicating benefits of proposed rules:]

1. Numbers of appropriators
2. Size of CPR
3. Temporal and spatial variability of resource units
4. Current condition of CPR
5. Market conditions for resource units
6. Amount and type of conflict
7. Availability of data about (1) through (6)
8. Status quo rules in use
9. Proposed rules

[Variables describing forecasted costs of changing the status quo:]

1. Number of decision makers
2. Heterogeneity of interests
3. Rules in use for changing rules
4. Skills and assets of leaders
5. Proposed rule
6. Past strategies of appropriators
7. Autonomy to change rules

[Variables describing resulting costs for monitoring and enforcement:]

1. Size and structure of CPR
2. Exclusion technology
3. Appropriation technology
4. Marketing arrangement
5. Proposed rules
6. Legitimacy of rules in use

[Variables affecting internal norms and discount rate:]

1. Appropriators live near CPR
2. Appropriators involved in many situations together
3. Information made available to appropriators about opportunities that exist elsewhere

[Better to view institutional choices as informed judgements about uncertain benefits and costs as opposed to mechanical calculation.]

whether grazing areas are used to produce milk or wool or meat can affect the ability of the appropriators to learn more rapidly about adverse conditions, should they arise. Milking occurs daily, and variations in yield are rapidly apparent to the herders. Wool is sheared less frequently, but the quality of wool is immediately apparent to those who herd sheep. The quality of meat produced for market is monitored less frequently and may not even be known by herders. Consequently, the quality and timeliness of the information that CPR appropriators obtain about their resource vary according to how a resource unit is used, as well as across resource types. The problems of groundwater pumpers in obtaining accurate and valid information about the condition of their CPR are more daunting than those of herders, regardless of the final products of herding activities.

[In a setting where external government has little effect on internal choices, the likelihood of appropriators adopting rule changes positively relates to whether:]

1 Most appropriators share a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule.
2 Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes.
3 Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from this
CPR; in other words, they have low discount rates.
4 Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs.
5 Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.
6 The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable.

The typical assumptions of complete information, independent action, perfect symmetry of interests, no human error, no norms of reciprocity, zero monitoring and enforcement costs, and no capacity to transform the situation itself will lead to highly particularized models, not universal theories.

1. [Define clear boundaries for the resource and who can share in it.]
2. [Proportion the sharing based on local conditions.]
3. [Empower those affected by the rules to modify them.]
4. [Monitor with stakeholders who are accountable.]
5. [Sanction those who violate rules with gradual escalation based on context and severity.]
6. [Prepare low-cost local conflict-resolution mechanisms in the event of disagreement.]
7. [Recognize the right to self-organization without challenge from external authorities.]

Irrigation rotation systems, for example, usually place the two actors most concerned with cheating in direct contact with one another. The irrigator who nears the end of a rotation turn would like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the amount of water obtained). The next irrigator in the rotation system waits nearby for him to finish, and would even like to start early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the second from an early start, the presence of the second irrigator deters the first from a late ending. Neither has to invest additional resources in monitoring activities. Monitoring is a by-product of their own strong motivations to use their water rotation turns to the fullest extent.

personal rewards for doing a good job are given to appropriators who monitor. The individual who finds a rule-infractor gains status and prestige for being a good protector of the commons. The infractor loses status and prestige. Private benefits are allocated to those who monitor.

Because the appropriators tend to continue monitoring the guards, as well as each other, some redundancy is built into the monitoring and sanctioning system. Failure to deter rule-breaking by one mechanism does not trigger a cascading process of rule infractions, because other mechanisms are in place.

The first step is that the village forester marks the trees ready to be harvested. The second step is that the households eligible to receive timber form work reams and equally divide the work of cutting the trees, hauling the logs, and piling the logs into approximately equal stacks. A lottery is then used to assign particular stacks to the eligible households. No harvesting of trees is authorized at any other time of year.

[It was considered reasonable for the land violations detective to demand cash and sake from infractors and use it for their own enjoyment. In addition to those penalties, contraband harvest was confiscated along with equipment and horses, the latter two only retrievable by paying a fine to the village.]