I commit myself to follow the set of rules we have devised in all instances except dire emergencies if the rest of those affected make a similar commitment and act accordingly.
Once appropriators have made contingent self-commitments, they are then motivated to monitor other people's behaviors, at least from time to time, in order to assure themselves that others are following the rules most of the time. Contingent self-commitments and mutual monitoring reinforce one another, especially when appropriators have devised rules that tend to reduce monitoring costs.
[Seeming simplicity is not equivalent to generality. Setting variables to a constant usually narrows the applicability of a model rather than broadening it.]
['I will if you will' becomes credible through monitoring that makes deviations visible.]
[Variables indicating benefits of proposed rules:]
- Numbers of appropriators
- Size of CPR
- Temporal and spatial variability of resource units
- Current condition of CPR
- Market conditions for resource units
- Amount and type of conflict
- Availability of data about (1) through (6)
- Status quo rules in use
- Proposed rules
[Variables describing forecasted costs of changing the status quo:]
- Number of decision makers
- Heterogeneity of interests
- Rules in use for changing rules
- Skills and assets of leaders
- Proposed rule
- Past strategies of appropriators
- Autonomy to change rules
[Variables describing resulting costs for monitoring and enforcement:]
- Size and structure of CPR
- Exclusion technology
- Appropriation technology
- Marketing arrangement
- Proposed rules
- Legitimacy of rules in use
[Variables affecting internal norms and discount rate:]
- Appropriators live near CPR
- Appropriators involved in many situations together
- Information made available to appropriators about opportunities that exist elsewhere
[Better to view institutional choices as informed judgements about uncertain benefits and costs as opposed to mechanical calculation.]
whether grazing areas are used to produce milk or wool or meat can affect the ability of the appropriators to learn more rapidly about adverse conditions, should they arise. Milking occurs daily, and variations in yield are rapidly apparent to the herders. Wool is sheared less frequently, but the quality of wool is immediately apparent to those who herd sheep. The quality of meat produced for market is monitored less frequently and may not even be known by herders. Consequently, the quality and timeliness of the information that CPR appropriators obtain about their resource vary according to how a resource unit is used, as well as across resource types. The problems of groundwater pumpers in obtaining accurate and valid information about the condition of their CPR are more daunting than those of herders, regardless of the final products of herding activities.
[In a setting where external government has little effect on internal choices, the likelihood of appropriators adopting rule changes positively relates to whether:]
1 Most appropriators share a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule.
2 Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes.
3 Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from this
CPR; in other words, they have low discount rates.
4 Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs.
5 Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.
6 The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable.
The typical assumptions of complete information, independent action, perfect symmetry of interests, no human error, no norms of reciprocity, zero monitoring and enforcement costs, and no capacity to transform the situation itself will lead to highly particularized models, not universal theories.